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ABSTRACT
Data on sales of memory modules are used to explore several aspects of e-retail demand. There is
a strong relationship between e-retail sales to a given state and sales tax rates that apply to purchases
from online retailers. This suggests that there is substantial substitution between online and online
retail, and tax avoidance may be an important contributor to e-retail activity. Geography matters in
two ways: we find some evidence that consumers prefer purchasing from firms in nearby states to
benefit from faster shipping times as well as evidence of a separate preference for buying from
in-state firms. Consumers appear fairly rational in some ways, but boundedly rational in others.
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The recent growth of Internet retail (e-retail) has attracted a great deal of attention in the
academic literature and popular press.1 While we have learned a lot about the structure
of these markets the past few years, the remarkable swings in the market value of e-retail
companies provides ample evidence that our understanding of the industry’s future is quite
limited.2 This future of e-retail is of interest for both intellectual and practical reasons.
Intellectually, e-retail is a great case study: it provides an opportunity to reexamine our
understanding of consumer and ﬁrm behavior and suggests new questions. Practically, e-
retail could have signiﬁcant eﬀects on the economy. It will not remain small for long at
its current growth rate: it has grown steadily at about 25% per year since the collapse
of the dot-com “bubble.” And even a small e-retail industry could have a substantial
impact on traditional retail, which employs as many Americans all manufacturing industries
combined.3
In this paper we investigate aspects of consumer behavior that will have a substantial
impact on the future of Internet and traditional retail. We focus on three issues. First,
we examine substitution betweeen Internet and traditional retail. It is not clear whether
e-retail or traditional retail will prove more eﬃcient in the long run. Whether the two are
close substitutes, though, will have a dramatic impact on the future of the less eﬃcient
channel. Second, we examine the extent to which the success e-retail has had is due to
the de facto tax-free status of most e-retail purchases in the U.S.4 This bears on the rel-
ative eﬃciency of e-retail, and is important to understanding what may happen if states
are able to tax online sales, with the Internet Tax Nondiscrimination Act set to expire in
1See, for example, Goolsbee (2000), Smith (2001), Chevalier and Goolsbee (2003), and Ellison and Ellison
(2005).
2Amazon’s market value, for example, grew from $2 billion at the start of 1998 to $35 billion in the
middle of 1999, and fell back to $3 billion in 2001 before reaching $25 billion for a second time in 2003.
3U.S. e-retail sales are now approximately $100 billion per year, which is 3% of total retail sales.
4Forty ﬁve U.S. states levy sales taxes on traditional retail purchases. Each of these states also has laws
assessing “use taxes” on purchases that its residents make from out-of-state ﬁrms. However, the Supreme
Court ruled in Quill vs. North Dakota (1992) that absent new federal law, a state could not compel a ﬁrm
without substantial physical “nexus” in that state to collect use taxes on its behalf. The 1998 Internet Tax
Nondiscrimination Act makes explicit that web presence alone does not constitute nexus. While consumers
are obligated to self-report use-tax liability, few do in practice. Note that states are able to collect sales
taxes on e-retailers’ in-state sales.
12007.5 Third, we examine the geography of e-retail. It is commonly supposed that geo-
graphic diﬀerentiation is an important factor allowing traditional retail stores to maintain
the markups over marginal cost they need to survive. Branding, obfuscation, or other fac-
tors may allow e-retailers to survive even without geographic diﬀerentiation, but knowing
whether geographic diﬀerentiation is really eliminated is also important for understanding
what market structure might evolve.6
Although everything we study is in the context of e-retail, this paper can also be thought
of more generally as an empirical analysis of consumer informedness and sophistication. The
standard fully-informed, rational analysis would make a number of simple predictions, e.g.
consumers should compare ﬁrms on the basis of the tax-inclusive prices and make decisions
on the basis of the prices charged at the time when the purchase is made (as opposed
to at other times). Alternate predictions could be obtained in a number of ways. For
instance, one could use rational models with information acquisition costs, rational models
with information processing costs, or models with “irrational” consumers. We ﬁnd that
several of the standard predictions appear not to hold in our data and discuss what this
suggests about the form of our consumers’ bounded rationality.7
The environment we study is that examined in Ellison and Ellison (2004): we look
at consumers shopping for computer memory modules using the Pricewatch.com search
engine. For a period of approximately one year, we have hourly data on the twelve lowest
prices listed on Pricewatch for each of several products. We know the state in which the
e-retailer listing each price is located. Our quantity data is unusually good in one respect
and unusually bad in another. The bad part is that we only observe purchases from two of
the listed websites (both located in California), so we do not know how many consumers
purchased from other websites (or from traditional retailers). The good part is that the
5There are two ways in which the de facto tax-free status of Internet purchases in the U.S. might be
threatened in the near future. The expiration of the Internet Tax Nondiscrimination Act in 2007 could
have implications for the legal deﬁnition of nexus. In addition, eighteen states have joined the Streamlined
Sales Tax Project in an attempt to simplify and harmonize their sales tax laws. The Project’s goals are to
encourage online retailers to agree to collect use taxes for sales made in those eighteen states and, eventually,
to pave the way to federal legislation requiring collection of use taxes.
6See Brynjolfsson and Smith (2001), Chevalier and Goolsbee (2003), Baye and Morgan (2004), Ellison
(2005), and Ellison and Ellison (2004).
7Hossain and Morgan (2006)’s analysis of bidding on eBay provides compelling evidence of limitations
in consumer rationality in that environment.
2data are at the individual order level and include each consumer’s location.
The structure of the data provides several nice opportunities for examining consumer
preferences and behavior. First, the fact that we observe the state in which each consumer
is located creates an opportunity to look at geography, taxes, and online-oﬄine substitu-
tion: we can quantify the extent to which our websites sell more in states that levy higher
sales taxes—taxes primarily aﬀect the ﬁrm’s competitive position relative to traditional
retailers—and to states that are nearby. Second, there is substantial turnover in the Price-
watch lists, both in terms of which websites make the list of the twelve lowest-priced and
in their price ranking. Hence, there are many hours in which our two websites are mostly
competing against other California e-retailers, and others in which they are competing
against e-retailers in New Jersey, Illinois, Oregon, etc. with similar prices. Looking at how
state-speciﬁc sales in a given hour are aﬀected by the competitors’ locations is another way
to identify geography and tax eﬀects. Third, wholesale prices for memory modules are re-
markably volatile. In the highly competitive Pricewatch universe, wholesale price increases
and decreases are passed through very quickly. Many traditional retailers, in contrast, keep
prices ﬁxed over the course of each week at the price they advertised in the latest Sun-
day sales circular. This creates a interesting source of variation between online and oﬄine
prices: in some weeks the online-oﬄine price gap is much lower on Friday than it was on
Sunday, and in other weeks it is much higher. How consumers react to this price gap will
again be informative on online-oﬄine substitution and consumer awareness of up-to-date
price information.
The paper is organized around two analyses designed to exploit diﬀerent sources of
variation. In Section 3 we exploit the time-invariant factors—state-level tax rates and
diﬀerences in state-to-state shipping times—in the simplest way possible. We run cross-
section regressions examining the total number of orders received from each state over
the course of the year. These regressions provide clear evidence that tax savings are an
important motivation for online shopping: our e-retailer’s sales are substantially greater in
high-tax states than in low-tax states. We can provide an additional piece of supporting
evidence to bolster the case that the diﬀerences are due to taxes and not due to unobserved
consumer heterogeneity: our e-retailer sells much less in California than in comparable
3states. (This would be expected under the tax hypothesis because our e-retailer must
charge sales tax on sales to California residents.) These cross-section regressions provide
some weak evidence that geography matters for shipping-time reasons and that consumers
are somewhat more sensitve to diﬀerences in tax rates for more expensive products (for
which the tax diﬀerence in dollars is larger).
Section 4 applies standard demand estimation techniques in an unusual way to exploit
the hourly variation in the data: we estimate discrete choice models that use as their
dependent variable the number of orders of a given product from consumers in a particular
state in a particular hour.8 The nonstandard part of the application is that we only have
data on consumer purchases from two of the listed ﬁrms. Normally, one applies discrete
choice models to datasets containing all ﬁrms’ market shares. Having data on all ﬁrms is,
however, not necessary to identify the model given that we have substantial intertemporal
variation in the characteristics of the competitors. It is this variation that helps us learn
about substitution between e-retailers, how much attention consumers pay to geography,
taxes, and so forth, simply by looking at how our ﬁrm’s sales go up and down as rivals’
prices and locations change.
The discrete-choice analysis provides some evidence that consumers pay attention to
diﬀerences in the taxes between e-retailers. There is little evidence of geographic diﬀerences
between retailers due to diﬀerences in shipping times. Geography does appear to have one
signiﬁcant eﬀect: consumers are estimated to have a strong preference for purchasing from
e-retailers located in their own state (after controlling for diﬀerences in shipping times and
sales taxes).
A general theme that emerges from the discrete-choice analysis is that consumers seem
far from the fully-informed, fully-rational ideal. Consumers react very strongly to price
diﬀerences in settings where the price comparisons are easy, such as between competing
e-retailers. They react less strongly to tax diﬀerences of a similar magnitude. They react
less strongly still, hardly at all, to transitory variation between online and oﬄine prices of a
similar magnitude. These ﬁndings are roughly consistent with models of costly information
8These regressions include dummy variables for each state so that the results derive from variation that
is independent of the variation that identiﬁes the cross-section regressions of Section 3.
4acquisition or rule-of-thumb reasoning.
Our work is related to a number of previous papers. The standard reference on In-
ternet taxation is Goolsbee (2000). It examines a 1997 survey in which 25,000 consumers
were asked (among many other things) whether they had ever bought products online.
Consumers living in states with higher sales tax rates are found to be more likely to have
bought products online. The big-picture conclusion is that subjecting e-retailers to taxa-
tion could reduce online sales by 24%. One motivation for the the tax part of our paper is
to address a couple potential concerns about Goolsbee’s work: an elasticity derived from
analyzing whether consumers ever purchase anything on the Internet could be very diﬀerent
from the elasticity of total quantity with respect to taxes (which will reﬂect much more the
behavior of intensive Internet shoppers); and one could also worrry that some of the tax
eﬀects he ﬁnds could be due to diﬀerences in unobserved consumer characteristics across
states (driven, for example, by California and Washington having high sales taxes as well
as populations inclined to use the Internet).9 Our tax results also relate, of course, to the
literature on the eﬀects of sales taxes on location and consumer behavior in traditional
retail, e.g. Fox (1986) and Walsh and Jones (1988).
A number of other papers have used data from price search engines to examine aspects
of e-retail demand. Brynjolfsson and Smith (2001) examines consumers who visited Even-
Better.com in 1999. It has a puzzling ﬁnding on taxes: consumers are estimated to be
twice as sensitive to diﬀerences in taxes as they are to diﬀerences in item prices.10 It also
ﬁnds strong evidence that consumers prefer branded e-retailers over lesser known ﬁrms.
One limitation is that they do not actually have any quantity data. The quantity data is
imputed by assuming that that consumers purchased from the e-retailer they visited last.
Ellison and Ellison (2004) examines the same Pricewatch data as this paper. It notes that
websites attracting customers via Pricewatch.com have extremely price-elastic demand, and
9Despite the examples of California and Washington, sales taxes in the U.S. are, in fact, not positively
correlated with the demographic controls for computer usage we employ. For example, Louisiana, Ten-
nessee, Oklahoma, and Alabama each have both one of the eight highest average tax rates in the country
and a below average fraction of households with home Internet access. Goolsbee casts doubt on the unob-
served heterogeneity explanation for his results by using extensive household-level demographic controls, by
including MSA dummies, and by showing that tax rates are not correlated with ownership of computers.
10This could be explained as an artifact of price endogeneity if higher prices are associated with higher
unobserved quality whereas higher taxes are not.
5investigates how it is that ﬁrms are able to maintain nontrivial markups. The primary ob-
servations on this count are that ﬁrms engage in a great deal of obfuscation, and that an
adverse selection disincentive for price cutting, like that described in Ellison (2005), ap-
pears to be present. Baye, Gatti, Kattumen and Morgan (2005) examine clickstream data
on consumers shopping for PDAs through the Kelkoo.com search engine in 2003. They ﬁnd
price sensitivity and take advantage of the structure of their data to address a number of
other questions: how price-sensitivity varies with the number of listed ﬁrms; how screen-
and price-rank separately inﬂuence demand; etc.
Several papers have addressed online-oﬄine competition with limited data. Brown and
Goolsbee (2001) ﬁnd that in the mid 1990’s term life insurance rates dropped more for
demographic groups whose members were more likely to have Internet access. Goolsbee
(2001) constructs a measure of the competitiveness of local retail markets using survey data
on the prices paid for consumers and shows that consumers in less competitive traditional
retail markets are more likely to buy computers online.11 Prince (2005) also examines
online and oﬄine substitutability of personal computer purchases using the same measure of
competitiveness of traditional retail markets. Chiou (2005) examines consumer’s decisions
on where to purchase DVDs using a dataset that includes both online and oﬄine purchases.
We are not aware of any other work on spatial diﬀerentiation between e-retailers. A
number of papers have examined spatial diﬀerentiation in traditional retail, including Weis-
brod, Parcells and Kern (1984), Chiou (2005), and Davis (2006).
2 Data
In this paper we examine sales of four diﬀerent types of memory modules, 128MB PC100,
128MB PC133, 256MB PC100, and 256MB PC133.12 Our price data were obtained by
downloading the ﬁrst (or ﬁrst and second) screens from Pricewatch’s memory price lists
11These results could in part reﬂect unobserved heterogeneity: the high prices paid for computers in an
area could also reﬂect the presence of consumers who are more computer savvy and purchase computers
that are of higher quality in the unobserved dimensions.
12As described in Ellison and Ellison (2004), our e-retailer sells three versions of each of these types of
memory modules. The three versions are clearly ranked in quality. In this paper, we restrict our attention
to the lowest quality “generic” version of each type of memory module. This is the only quality level for
which one can easily use Pricewatch to identify competitors’ prices. Low quality memory also accounts for
the majority of our ﬁrm’s sales.
6on an hourly basis from from May 2000 to May 2001 (with some gaps). Our data on the
128MB modules include information on the twenty four lowest-priced websites listed on
Pricewatch. The data on 256MB modules include information on the twelve lowest-priced
websites. There is a fair amount of turnover and reshuﬄing of the price lists from day to
day (and even from hour to hour in some periods). Over the course of the year there is
a dramatic decrease in prices. For example, in the space of a year the price of a 128MB
modules fell from about $120 to about $20.
Pricewatch does not calculate sales taxes for consumers on these pages, but it does list
the home state of each retailer so that a consumer who knew the tax rate in his home state
(and understood that sales taxes will apply if and only if he or she buys from an in-state
ﬁrm) could take sales tax diﬀerences into account. We downloaded the state locations as
well.
We obtained quantity data for these products from an Internet retailer that gets most of
its traﬃc from Pricewatch. It operates two similar websites, which typically have diﬀerent
prices for the products studied.13 The quantity data again cover May 2000 to May 2001
with some gaps. The raw data are at the level of the individual order. We use data on
approximately 15,000 orders. The available data on each order include the website from
which the customer made the order, detail on what was ordered, and the shipping address.
Our e-retailer is just one of many listing products for sale on Pricewatch. A rough estimate
is that 100,000 other consumers visited Pricewatch during our sample period and purchased
a corresponding product from one of the e-retailers for which we do not have quantity data.
We also use a few state-level variables. The most important of these is the state’s
average sales tax rate. Sales tax rates vary by county and locality in many states. Our
data are averages across the various jurisdictions within a state computed by a private ﬁrm.
We collected data on UPS ground shipping times by querying the UPS website. These data
include both shipping times from our e-retailer’s zip code to each state, and a state-to-state
shipping time matrix.14 Our other state level variables come from Census Bureau datasets:
13There are several possible motivations for having multiple websites: they may be given diﬀerent looks
and consumers may have heterogeneous reactions; it allows the websites to be more specialized (which
seems to be attractive to some consumers); it facilitates experimentation; it may help promote private-label
branded products; The ﬁrm may occupy multiple places on the Pricewatch screen.
14UPS provides these data on a zip code to zip code basis and there can be some within-state variation.
7the fraction of households with home Internet access as reported in a 2001 survey, the
population of each state in the 2000 census, and the number of computer stores and gas
stations reported in the 1997 Census of Retail Industries.
3 Analysis of aggregate state-level sales
In this section we take the most straightforward approach to examine how the time invariant
variables in our dataset—sales tax rates and shipping times—aﬀect consumer demand.
We construct measures of the total number of orders received from each state, and use
regressions to, for example, look at whether our e-retailer sells more in states with high
sales taxes than in states with low sales taxes.
3.1 Summary statistics
The regressions in this section will have 51 observations: one for each state and the District
of Columbia. We use two primary dependent variables: Quantity128 is the number of orders
for 128MB modules received over the course of the year from a given state; Quantity256
is the corresponding number for 256MB modules.15 Summary statistics for the basic re-
gressions are presented in Table 1. Our e-retailer sells 204 128MB memory modules to the
average state over the course of the year. This ranges from a low of 19 in the District of
Columbia to a high of 762 in Texas. Unit sales of 256MB memory modules are about half
as large. The average sales tax rate is 5.7 percent. Four states have no state or local sales
taxes. The UPS ground shipping time from our retailer to the average state is about 4
days.16 The percentage of households with home Internet access varies from a low of 40.6%
in the District of Columbia to a high of 70.2% in New Hampshire. The average state has
230 computer stores. The ratio of computer stores to gas stations ranges from a low of
0.041 in West Virginia to a high of 0.184 in California.
We typically collected data using one zip code from the the largest population center in the state. In some
cases where a state did not have one dominant population center and the shipping time varied we took an
average of the times for the two largest population centers.
15Note that in doing this we are summing both over the two websites for which we have data and over
the two speeds of each size memory module: PC100 and PC133. We do this because there is no reason to
expect that taxes or geography would have a diﬀerent impact across websites or speeds.
16The minimum value of 1.5 days reﬂects that shipping times are one day for shipments to Southern
California and two days for shipments to Northern California.
8Although prices are not used in this state-level anaysis, they are relevant for the inter-
pretation of some results. The mean price of a 128MB memory module is $70. The mean
price of a 256MB memory module is $139. A one percentage point diﬀerence in tax rates,
then, adds 70 cents on average to a 128MB module but $1.39 to a 256MB module.
3.2 Basic results
To analyze how the number of orders received from state s is related to the state’s tax rate
we estimate a negative binomial regression model, i.e. we assume
Quantitys ∼ Poisson(µs)




+ β5InternetAccesss + β6 log(Populations) + s,
where the s are independent random variables with es ∼ Γ(θ,θ), and estimate the para-
meters by maximum likelihood.17 One can think of this as similar to estimating a linear
regression with logQs as the dependent variable.18
Table 2 presents coeﬃcients obtained from estimating the regression above on the total
unit sales to each of the 51 states. The ﬁrst column uses 128MB memory module sales as
the dependent variable. The results are strongly suggestive that sales taxes have a large
eﬀect on online sales. The 5.94 coeﬃcient estimate on OﬄineSalesTaxRate indicates that
a one percentage point increase in a state’s sales tax increases the number of orders our
e-retailer receives from that state by about 6%. The average sales tax rate in our data is
5.7%. Hence, in a typical state, online purchases would be predicted to decrease by about
30% if the oﬄine sales tax were eliminated. Goolsbee argues that this is a good forecast
17The Poisson regression model is the special case of the negative binomial with θ = ∞. In applied work
it is common to ﬁnd that a speciﬁcation test can reject the Poisson model in favor of other models that allow
for more dispersion. The particular assumption that the errors are distributed like the logarithm of a gamma
random variable (as opposed to being normally distributed for example) is motivated by the fact that a
relationship between Poisson and gamma random variables allows the likelihood to be evaluated without
a numerical integration. The distribution of Qs turns out to be negative binomial which is what gives the
model its name. Section 19.9.4 of Greene (1997) provides a clear description of the model. Hausman, Hall
and Griliches (1984) discuss a number of models for count data.
18The advantage of the negative binomial regression is that the model can be estimated in the same way
regardless of whether some of quantities are zero. All quantities are positive in our base analysis, but there
will be some zeros in later analyses of quantities sold during particular time periods. The third and fourth
columns of table 2 show coeﬃcient estimates from regressions with log(Qs) as a dependent variable for
comparison. The results are similar.
9for the impact of taxing online sales—the implicit assumption is that achieving tax parity
between online and oﬄine retail should have a similar eﬀect regardless of whether it is
achieved by increasing online taxes or by decreasing oﬄine taxes.
The extra customers our ﬁrm attracts in states with high sales tax rates could in prinici-
ple be coming from three sources: they might otherwise have purchased from traditional
retailers, from other online retailers, or not at all. Few of our e-retailer’s online competitors
are in any particular state (other than California), so very little of the added demand could
be taken from online retailers in the customer’s home state. It also seems unlikely that
most could be people who otherwise would have chosen not to buy memory, because this
would require a highly elastic aggregate demand for memory.19 We conclude that there
must be substantial substitution between online retail and oﬄine retail.
The coeﬃcient on the California dummy provides additional support for the view that
what we have estimated is a tax eﬀect and not an artifact of unobserved state-level het-
erogeneity. What would we predict about our ﬁrm’s sales to California if the coeﬃcient on
OﬄineSalesTaxRate is truly a tax eﬀect? First, since our ﬁrm has no tax advantage relative
to brick and mortar stores in California—its California customers must pay sales tax—we
would expect its sales to be about 35% lower than one would otherwise predict given state
covariates. (California sales are taxed at 7.25%.) Second, our ﬁrm has a disadvantage
relative to non-California e-retailers when selling in California. One would expect that this
disadvantage would lead to an additional reduction in sales. The estimated coeﬃcient on
California indicates that sales to California customers are about 67% lower than sales to
comparable states. It is implausible that an eﬀect of this magnitude could be due to an
unobserved distaste for online shopping on the part of Californians.
The estimate on the ShippingTime variable provides some weak evidence that geography
still matters on the Internet. Sales are estimated to be reduced by about 10% if UPS ground
shipping to the destination state is one day longer.
The coeﬃcients on the other control variables seem reasonable. Sales are higher in
states where the fraction of residents with Internet access is higher. We cannot reject that
19The regressions of quantity on the log of the lowest listed price reported in Ellison and Ellison (2004)
suggest that the elasticity of aggregate demand with respect to price may be close to one.
10the coeﬃcient is one, which would correspond with sales being proportional to the number
of people with home Internet access. The coeﬃcient on the computer store-gas station
ratio might be expected to have either sign: it reﬂects both interest in computers and
the availability of computer parts at traditional retail stores. The estimated coeﬃcient is
positive but not statistically signiﬁcant. Population is obviously a strong determinant of
aggregate sales. Potential reasons why the coeﬃcient might be less than one include that
population is an imperfect proxy for the potential market size (which is aﬀected by income,
business activity, and other factors), and that larger population states may have better
oﬄine retail.
The second column of Table 2 presents coeﬃcient estimates from a regression with orders
for 256MB memory modules as the dependent variable. These results are very similar: sales
are substantially higher in states that levy higher sales taxes on traditional retail purchases;
sales are notably lower in California; there is weak evidence that shipping times may aﬀect
sales; the eﬀects of the other demographic variables are similar.
The third and fourth columns of Table 2 report demand estimates obtained via OLS
regressions with log(Quantity)s as the depedent variable. The results are quite similar to
those from the negative binomial regressions.
3.3 Demand at diﬀerent price levels
The fact that we have data on goods sold at diﬀerent prices provides an additional oppor-
tunity to gain insights into consumer behavior: we can compare the eﬀects of sales taxes
on sales of expensive and inexpensive products. What would we expect to ﬁnd in such a
comparison?
A good way to think about this is in terms of a discrete-choice model with heterogeneous
preferences for online vs. oﬄine shopping: suppose a consumer of type θ in market i gets
utility vi,on − pi,on if she buys online and vi,oﬀ − pi,oﬀ(1 + t) + θ if she buys oﬄine and
that the CDF of θ in market i is Fi. In such a model, a dt increase in the oﬄine tax
rate increases the eﬀective oﬄine price by pi,oﬀdt and thereby increases online demand by
pi,oﬀfi(pi,oﬀ)dt. The answer is therefore that estimated coeﬃcients on the tax rate may
diﬀer across products, and whether they do should reﬂect how the distribution of consumer
11preferences for oﬄine vs. online shopping compares for the two products, expensive and
inexpensive. How we would expect these distributions to compare depends on where the θs
come from. For example, if θ was primarily determined by a consumer’s taste for computer
use vs. driving, then the the most natural assumption would be that the distribution of
θ would not vary across products. In this case, the sensitivity of online demand to the
oﬄine tax rate should be proportional to the product price. Alternatively, the distribution
of θ could arise from heterogeneity in consumers’ willingness-to-pay to get the product
immediately. In such a case, it would be more natural to assume that what is invariant
across products is the percentage of the product price that a consumer is willing to pay to
avoid waiting for the product to arrive. In this case, the density of θ would be inversely
proportional to the product price, and the sensitivity of online demand to the oﬄine tax
rate would be constant across products.
Our dataset has two sources of variation that let us make such comparisons. First, we
can compare the demand for 128MB modules with the demand for 256MB modules. The
sales-weighted mean price of a 256MB memory module is about 60% higher than that of
a 128MB module. Looking at the ﬁrst and second columns of Table 2 we note that the
coeﬃcient estimate on OﬄineSalesTaxRate for 256MB modules is slightly larger than that
for 128MB modules. The standard errors, however, are suﬃciently large so that we can
reject neither that they are equal nor that they diﬀer by 60%.
Second, we can exploit the substantial time-series variation in prices by comparing de-
mand in diﬀerent time periods. For example, we look at the demand for 128MB modules in
the time period when they were over $100 compared with a period a few months later when
they were much cheaper. The ﬁrst two columns of Table 3 contain such a comparison.20
The estimates in the ﬁrst two columns indicate that quantities were more sensitive to dif-
ferences in tax rates in the period when 128MB modules were more expensive, suggestive
that consumers’ channel preferences are more likely ﬁxed and not dependent on item price.
Again, though, the estimates are not suﬃciently precise to allow us to reject equality. The
20The former period is at the end of our data, whereas the latter is mostly in the summer of 2000. Each of
these is again estimated via a negative binomial regression run on a cross-section containing 51 observations.
By “obtained from two separate time periods” we mean that the ﬁrst dependent variable is obtained by
summing the hourly sales to each state over the set of hours during which the lowest price on Pricewatch
was between 20 and 50 dollars.
12evidence in the third and fourth column is less conclusive. The point estimate is about 20%
larger in the high-price period, but the diﬀerences are far from signiﬁcant.
The results on the California dummy are similar. In Table 3 the coeﬃcient on the
California dummy is larger in the period when the products are more expensive, but the
diﬀerences are not signiﬁcant. In Table 2 the point estimates are not larger for the more
expensive product.
In summary, the comparisons across products and across times provide quite limited
evidence of demand being more sensitive to diﬀerences in tax rates for more expensive
items. It could be that the eﬀect is there and data limitations prevent us from seeing it.
Alternatively, it could be that the tax-sensitivity does not vary much. Such a result could
be explained in two ways. First, it is possible that channel preferences may be scaling up
with the item price, as mentioned above. A primary source of online-oﬄine diﬀerentiation
could be heterogeneity in the disutility for waiting for online purchases to arrive. A second
“irrational” explanation would be that consumers may follow fairly simple rules of thumb.
For example, the ones in high tax states may have learned that it is generally a good idea to
buy products online and save on the sales tax, but have not developed more sophisticated
rules recognizing that the tax savings are larger on more expensive items.
4 A Discrete-Choice Analysis
The Pricewatch environment exhibits an unusual degree of short-term variation in compet-
itive conditions. This variation provides a nice opportunity to gain additional insight into
e-retail demand and consumer behavior. In this section we use discrete-choice models to
explore substitution between online and oﬄine retail, substitution between e-retailers, the
eﬀects of geography and sales taxes, and consumer sophistication.
4.1 Motivation
The analysis in this section is designed to exploit two sources of short-term variation in our
data: turnover in the relative price rankings and changes in price levels that are common to
most ﬁrms. We brieﬂy discuss each of these to provide some intuition for what the variation
is and why it should be useful.
134.1.1 Turnover in price rankings
Figure 1 is a particularly clean example of the type of turnover in the relative price rankings
we see multiple times a day. As such, it provides a nice illustration of how we can exploit
this turnover to estimate aspects of consumer behavior. It shows the twelve e-retailers
listed on the ﬁrst screen of Pricewatch’s 128MB PC100 memory page at 9am and 11am on
August 1, 2000.
Two of the e-retailers made price changes between these two times. Coast-to-Coast
Memory of New Jersey, which oﬀered the lowest price of $112 at 9am, raised its price
suﬃciently so as to disappear from the top twelve by 11am. UpgradePlanet.com of Virginia,
which was on the second page of the 9am list at $128, reduced its price to $111 and took
over the top slot. The ﬁrst three columns show information presented on Pricewatch: the
e-retailers’ names, their locations, and their prices. The fourth through the sixth columns
contain numbers not presented on the Pricewatch site but which consumers could compute
from the given information: the tax-inclusive prices that customers in New Jersey, Virginia,
and California, respectively, would pay if they purchased from each of the e-retailers.21
Recall that we observe sales for two websites. However, we observe not just total sales
but sales into each state at each hour. This fact, along with the turnover in relative price
rankings, is crucial for our estimation strategy. To illustrate, consider ﬁrst the case where
we had sales by every ﬁrm into every state every hour. One could assess whether consumers
pay attention to tax diﬀerences by looking at whether UpgradePlanet was making many
more sales into New Jersey at 11am than Coast-to-Coast was making at 9am, and at
whether Coast-to-Coast was making more sales into Virginia at 9am then UpgradePlanet
was making at 11am. A preference for buying from nearby ﬁrms could, of course, oﬀset
the tax disadvantage. Geographic preference, however, could be separately identiﬁed in
many ways. One could look at whether UpgradePlanet sells less than Coast-to-Coast had
in states bordering New Jersey and more in states bordering North Carolina. One could
use data from other points in time to look at how market shares in Oregon change when
an Oregon ﬁrm is or is not present at the top of the list. (Oregon has no sales tax.) One
21A consumer, of course, would need to know his or her local sales tax rate and the fact that sales taxes
are only assessed on in-state sales to make this calculation.
14Information on Pricewatch Price Price Price
Website State Price into NJ into VA into CA
Pricewatch ranking at 9:01am EDT
Coast-to-Coast Memory NJ 112 118.72 112 112
Connect Computers CA 113 113 113 121.64
Computer Craft FL 114 114 114 114
Advanced PCBoost CA 115 115 115 123.80
1st Choice Memory CA 116 116 116 124.87
Jazz Technology CA 117 117 117 125.95
Memplus.com CA 117 117 117 125.95
Portatech CA 119 119 119 128.10
Augustus Technology CA 120 120 120 129.18
EconoPC IL 120 120 120 120
Advanced Vision CA 121 121 121 130.26
Computer Super Sale IL 122 122 122 122
Pricewatch ranking at 11:01am EDT
UpgradePlanet.com VA 111 111 115.99 111
Connect Computers CA 113 113 113 121.64
Computer Craft FL 114 114 114 114
Advanced PCBoost CA 115 115 115 123.80
1st Choice Memory CA 116 116 116 124.87
Jazz Technology CA 117 117 117 125.95
Memplus.com CA 117 117 117 125.95
Portatech CA 119 119 119 128.10
Augustus Technology CA 120 120 120 129.18
EconoPC IL 120 120 120 120
Advanced Vision CA 121 121 121 130.26
Computer Super Sale IL 122 122 122 122
Figure 1: Sample Pricewatch rankings: 128MB PC100 memory modules on August 1, 2000
15could also examine tax eﬀects controlling for geographic preferences by looking at relative
magnitudes: does the $6.72 tax that Coast-to-Coast must levy in New Jersey have a larger
eﬀect than the $4.99 tax that UpgradePlanet must levy in Virginia?
Our quantity data are more limited: we observe sales for only two websites rather than
all websites. This limitation, however, should not prevent us from examining how con-
sumers react to diﬀerent competitive enviromnents: the reactions mentioned above would
be reﬂected in changes in the demand for the websites for which we do have data.
To think about how this works, suppose that our sales data were from Connect Com-
puters.22 At 9am Connect Computers’ tax-inclusive price for New Jersey residents is lower
than that of any other website. At 11am Connect Comptuters’ tax-inclusive price for New
Jersey residents is only the second lowest. Accordingly, if consumers pay attention to sales
taxes we would expect Connect Computers’ sales into New Jersey to be higher at 9am than
at 11am. Similarly, its sales into Virginia would be higher at 11am than at 9am. We can
estimate tax eﬀects controlling for a home state preference by looking at how the magni-
tude of the 9am-11am drop in Connect’s New Jersey sales compares with the 9am-11am
increase in Connect’s Virginia sales. A comparison of Connect’s California sales at 9am and
11am will teach us about substitution between retailers: shipping times from New Jersey
and Virginia to California are the same, so the comparison should help us learn how many
consumers shift from the second-lowest to the low-priced ﬁrm when the low-priced ﬁrm
reduces its price by one dollar.
4.1.2 Within-week changes in price levels
The second useful source of variation in our data is within-week changes in the level of
e-retail prices. Traditional retailers do not change their prices frequently. In particular, it
is common to advertise prices for memory modules in weekly sales circulars, so that the
prices remain constant each week from Sunday-Saturday. The prices listed on Pricewatch,
in contrast, are highly volatile. Many e-retailers hold essentially no inventory and pass on
wholesale price changes almost immediately.
Figure 2 provides an illustration. The thin line is the lowest price on Pricewatch for
22Connect Computers is, in fact, not one of the websites from which we have data.
16a 128MB PC100 memory module.23 There are many instances where the price changes
substantially over the course of a week. Usually these are price decreases. For example,
between Sunday, September 17, 2000 and Saturday, September 23, 2000, the price dropped
from $89 to $78. If consumers are rational and fully informed (and online and oﬄine retail
are close substitutes), then one would expect that an online retailer would sell more on this
Saturday than they had on the previous Sunday. Prices also rise at times. For example,
between Monday, November 20, 2000 and Friday, November 24, 2000, the online price
increased from $42 to $53. In such a week, one would expect that online retailers would
do worse on Friday and Saturday than they had on Sunday and Monday. Our data are
well-suited to examine such predicitons.
















Low Pricewatch Price      BestBuy Price
Figure 2: Online and Oﬄine Prices: 128MB PC100 memory modules
23To make the two price series more comparable, the shipping and handling fee that is standard on
Pricewatch, $11, has been added to the listed price.
17Toward the end of our sample period we collected price data for a comparable product
from the largest traditional electronics retailer, BestBuy.24 The bold line on the right side
of the ﬁgure is a graph of these prices. If we had similar data for our entire sample period
(and data from more retailers), we could try to estimate online-oﬄine substitution by using
the price gap as a primary explanatory variable. We do not have these data for most of our
sample period, however, so we will just estimate the eﬀect of within-week changes in online
prices and employ a set of time trends to control for longer-term trends in the online-oﬄine
price gap.
4.2 Methodology
Let Nsht be the number of consumers in state s purchasing a particular type of memory
module in hour h of day t from the twenty-four (or twelve for 256MB modules) websites
whose prices we observe. Assume that consumer k’s utility if he purchases from website i
is
uiksht = β1(Priceiht + β2SalesTaxisht) + β3ShippingTimeis
β4HomeStateis + β5SecondScreeniht + ik,
where SalesTax is the sales tax in dollars due on the purchase, ShippingTime is the UPS
ground shipping time, HomeState is a dummy variable for whether website i is in state s,
SecondScreen is a dummy indicating whether website i only appears on the second screen
of results, and ik is a logit random variable independent of the right hand side variables
(and of the additional right hand side variables and the error ηhst introduced below).
Writing Xsht for the vector of attributes on the right hand side of this expression, we
have the familiar logit formula for the number of consumers in state s buying from website





Our dataset only contains sales from two particular websites. It does not contain the
number of consumers purchasing from other websites, from traditional retailers, or not at
24The BestBuy product is a branded product that may be of higher quality than the products covered by
the online price data.
18all. The total number of consumers buying through Pricewatch is aﬀected by a number
of factors: there are clear day-of-week and hour-of-day eﬀects; Internet use is climbing
over our sample period; there are substantial price declines that should increase aggregate
demand; there is variation in the online-oﬄine price gap; and there may be intertemporal
price eﬀects with the size of the potential consumer pool at a given time being aﬀected
by past prices. Our data will not allow us to separately identify all of these eﬀects. The
approach we take is simply to specify a ﬂexible functional form for the aggregate Pricewatch
demand that could reﬂect each of the eﬀects. Speciﬁcally, we assume
Nsht = δsqheγ1MinPriceht+γ2SundayPriceht+γ3Weekendt+γ4TimeTrend1t+...+γ7TimeTrend4t + ηhst,
where δs is a state ﬁxed eﬀect to be estimated, qh is an hour-of-day ﬁxed eﬀect, Minpriceht
is the lowest price listed on Pricewatch, SundayPriceht is the price on the most recent
Sunday, Weekendt is a weekend dummy, the TimeTrend variables allow for linear time
trends with slopes changing every ninety days, and ηhst is a random error term assumed to
have mean zero conditional on the right hand side variables in this equation.25
We estimate the model via nonlinear least squares, using hour-website-destination state
sales as the dependent variable. The model could in principal be estimated on the 800,000
observation datasets obtained by using sales to each of the ﬁfty-one states in each of the
approximately 7900 hours by each of the two websites as the observations. Some states,
however, account for a very small portion of the sales in our dataset. Other states account
for a nontrivial number of purchases, but rarely or never have an in-state ﬁrm listed on
Pricewatch. Data on sales to such states will not help us in estimating tax sensitivities
because consumers in these states can purchase from any websites on the list without
paying sales tax. It would provide information on interﬁrm price elasticities, home-state
preferences, and online-oﬄine substitution, but the ﬁrst two of these can be estimated
25Note that we do not include an “outside good” in the discrete-choice set as one might do to attempt
to estimate the eﬀect of a logit-inclusive value on aggregate demand. We are thus implicitly assuming, for
example, that the total sales by Pricewatch e-retailers to state s are not aﬀected by the states in which
the e-retailers are located and the diﬀerence between the n
th loweset price and the lowest price. We do
this because we have little data to estimate such eﬀects, think they must be small, and prefer a more
parsimonious model in which fewer coeﬃcients are used to capture aggregate demand eﬀects. Reasons why
any inclusive-value eﬀects would be hard to ﬁnd include that prices on Pricewatch are almost always tightly
bunched, and that, in any state other than California, having more than one or two e-retailers on the list
from that state is extremely rare.
19precisely with sales to a smaller set of states. We decided to reduce the computational
burden by carrying out our analysis on a smaller dataset containing hourly sales by our two
websites in just ten states: Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania,
Texas, Virginia, and Wisconsin.
We carry out the estimation four times to obtain independent estimates using data on
each of the four products: 128MB PC100 modules, 128MB PC133 modules, 256MB PC100
modules, and 256MB PC133 modules.
Note that we are assuming that it is not necessary to use instruments for the prices on
the right hand side of the above equations. With regard to relative prices in the choice-
between-retailers equation, we think this is a very reasonable assumption and a major
reason why the Pricewatch environment is a nice one to study. We ﬁnd it implausible
that a substantial part of price variation is driven by information the ﬁrms have about a
particular hour on a particular day being a good time to have the third as opposed to the
seventh lowest price. With regard to the prices in the aggregate demand equation, one
could worry more about endogeneity. These estimates are not our primary focus, however,
so we are willing to think of them as coeﬃcients on reduced-form control variables rather
than as demand elasticities.
4.3 Summary Statistics
Table 4 reports summary statistics separately for each of the four types of memory modules.
The unit of observation is an hour-state-website. Given that our websites sell zero memory
modules to a typical state in a typical hour, average sales ﬁgures at this level are quite
low. For example, the average number of 128MB PC100 modules sold by a website in one
particular hour to one particular state is 0.013.26 Price is the price charged by our websites.
Mean prices are about $70 for 128MB modules and about $140 for the 256MB modules.
The dramatic price declines that occurred over the year are visible in the minimums and
maximums for this variable. MinPrice is the lowest price listed on Pricewatch in the hour
in question. Our ﬁrm’s 128MB prices are about $2 to $4 higher than this on average. Its
average rank on the Pricewatch list is sixth. The average gap between our ﬁrm’s 256MB
26We count a single order of multiple memory modules as having quantity one. For most of our time
period, our ﬁrm limited purchases of memory modules to one per order.
20price and the lowest available price is larger. Much of this is due to a period when one
ﬁrm oﬀered these modules at a very low price. Our ﬁrm’s average rank is still about sixth.
PSunday is the average value of MinPrice on the most recent Sunday. The summary
statistics for MinPrice − PSunday give a feel for the within-week price volatility. This
mean price diﬀerence for 128MB modules is well under a dollar but the standard deviation
is large. The mean price diﬀerence for 256MB modules is -$1.39 for PC100 and -$2.07 for
PC133. Again, there is a lot of variation around those means, with a minimum of -$51 and
a maximum of $36 for PC133 modules! (These ﬁgures are correct.)
We do not include California in our estimation, so consumers in the ten states we are
considering would not need to pay sales tax to buy from our websites. They would need to
pay sales tax if they bought from an in-state ﬁrm (except for those who live in Oregon).
Approximately 3% of the listed websites are in-state on average. The average tax that
would be paid if buying from an in-state ﬁrm is $7.04.
4.4 Basic Results
Table 5 presents coeﬃcient estimates obtained by performing separate nonlinear least
squares estimations on the data for each of the four products: 128MB PC100, 128MB
PC133, 256MB PC100, and 256MB PC133. In many ways, the four sets of results are quite
similar.
The most basic fact about the Pricewatch environment is that it is intensely competitive
(as we previously noted in Ellison and Ellison (2004)). The coeﬃcients on Price in the four
columns range from -0.47 to -0.82. The estimate for 128MB PC100 memory modules, for
example, corresponds to an own-price elasticity of -33 (holding all variables ﬁxed at their
sample means). The estimates are extraordinarily signiﬁcant. The decrease in demand that
occurs when our ﬁrm raises its price (or is undercut) is so large as to be impossible to miss.
The coeﬃcients on the time-trend variables illustrate the growth (and decline) of Price-
watch over our sample period. The coeﬃcient on TimeTrend1 in the ﬁrst column indicates
that that overall demand was growing at about 2% per day (equivalent to 60% per month)
in the ﬁrst three months of our sample (May-August, 2000). Growth rates for later periods
are obtained by adding all of the earlier coeﬃcients. This suggests that sales decreased 40%
21per month in the fall of 2000, were ﬂat in the winter 2000-01, and fell an additional 20%
per month in the spring of 2001. Growth rates for the other three products are similar,
suggesting these patterns are not just product-speciﬁc ﬂuctuations.
Figure 3 presents a graph of the hour dummies.27 They indicate that online shopping
picks up substantially between 7am and 11am, continues at approximately the 11am level
past the normal workday, remains at about 80% of peak value until midnight, and then drops
oﬀ substantially until 6am. The large number of late-night purchases suggests that greater






























Figure 3: Intraday Sales Pattern: 128MB PC100 memory modules
4.5 Taxes
Recall that in our demand speciﬁcation consumers are assumed to evaluate products on
the basis of Price + β2SalesTax, with SalesTax measured in dollars. Hence, an estimate
of one on the SalesTax coeﬃcient would correspond to the standard rational model in
which consumers care only about their total expenditure and an estimate of zero would
27Recall that we simply set these to the sample mean quantities for each hour rather than making them
part of the nonlinear least squares estimation. Sample means are computed on a time-zone adjusted basis
with the times of all purchases being recorded from the consumer’s perspective.
22correspond to consumers who are entirely insensitive to tax diﬀerences.28
The most general conclusion we draw from the four sets of results is that consumers pay
less attention to sales taxes than the standard rational model predicts. The estimates in
the four columns are 0.05 (s.e. 0.12), 0.38 (s.e. 0.15), 0.10 (s.e. 0.09), and 1.27 (s.e. 0.64).
Note that the ﬁrst three are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from unity while the second and last are
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. We interpret this as evidence that consumers are paying
attention to taxes but not as much as price diﬀerences of a similar magnitude. These eﬀects
are not very precisely estimated, though.
It is important to note that the fact that consumers pay less attention to tax diﬀerences
than to price diﬀerences does not imply that sales taxes are not important. Our consumers
are extraordinarily sensitive to price diﬀerences, so even if the coeﬃcient on the SalesTax
variable was 0.3, our estimates would be that a ﬁrm that must collect a 6% sales tax would
have its sales decline by about 60%.
4.6 Geography
Geography enters our demand model in two ways. First, ShippingTime allows for the
possiblity that consumers may prefer to buy from e-retailers in nearby states because they
will have faster delivery times with standard ground shipping. We fail to ﬁnd evidence of
such an eﬀect in these regressions: only two of the four estimates are negative; only one of
these is signiﬁcant. If one thinks about the magnitudes of these estimates relative to the
price coeﬃcients, one would conclude that any geographic eﬀects are small. A coeﬃcient
of 0.1 on the ShippingTime variable would mean that reducing the shipping time by one
day is comparable to reducing the price by about 20 cents. Recall that our cross sectional
regressions provided some evidence of a shipping time eﬀect, in contrast to what we ﬁnd
here.
Second, we included the HomeState dummy to allow for the possibility that consumers
may have an additional preference for buying from in-state ﬁrms. Here, we get consistent
28There are clearly other “rational” models in which the coeﬃcient would be greater than or less than
one. An example of the former is if price is a signal of quality so that a high price-zero tax oﬀer is preferable
to a low price-high tax oﬀer with the same total expenditure. Examples of the latter would be a model in
which consumers beneﬁt from taxes collected by their state government or have nonselﬁsh preferences and
thereby gain from payments to local ﬁrms and/or governments.
23results showing that geography does matter. Three of the four coeﬃcient estimates are
positive and signiﬁcant. The magnitudes of the coeﬃcient estimates indicate that the
home-state preference will roughly oﬀset a two dollar price diﬀerence. In light of our
earlier estimates that consumers pay less attention to diﬀerence in sales taxes than to
diﬀerences in prices, it also implies that the home-state preference will outweigh the sales-
tax disadvantage on moderately priced items. For example, if the SalesTax coeﬃcient is
0.33, the Price coeﬃcient is -0.5, the HomeState coeﬃcient is 1.0 and the tax rate is 6%,
then the home-state preference will outweigh the tax disadvantage on items costing $100
or less. The ﬁnding that the home state preference is nearly strong enough to outweigh the
tax-disadvantage of buying from an in-state ﬁrm contrasts with our earlier ﬁnding that our
ﬁrm sells much less in California than in other states. It is possible that some states enjoy
home state preference while others do not.
4.7 Online-Oﬄine Substitution
As noted above, the within-week variation in the online price provides an opportunity to
examine online-oﬄine substitution: when oﬄine prices are constant over the course of a
week, the online-oﬄine price gap will move one-for-one with changes in the online price. In
terms of the variables deﬁned above, the within-week change in the lowest price available
on Pricewatch is MinPrice − PSunday. Our speciﬁcation includes these two variables
separately in the equation for the number of online consumers.
The MinPrice variable is the lowest price available on Pricewatch in the hour in ques-
tion. Note that it may aﬀect the number of consumers buying memory on Pricewatch for
two reasons: aggregate demand will be higher when the price is lower; and a higher share of
consumers will buy online (as opposed of oﬄine) when the online-oﬄine price gap is wider.
Our estimates of this coeﬃcient are highly signiﬁcant and consistent across the four prod-
uct classes: a one-dollar decrease in the price of a memory module is estimated to increase
the total demand at Pricewatch retailers by about 3%. This corresponds with an elasticity
about -2 for the 128MB modules and about -4 for the 256MB modules (at the mean prices).
We take this result as suggestive of substantial online-oﬄine substitution, because it seems
unlikely that the aggregate demand for memory modules is so elastic. One piece of evidence
24to this eﬀect is that collusion between DRAM manufacturers led to a rougly 400% increase
in memory prices between December 2001 and May of 2002.29 Optimal collusion would
result in a much smaller price increase if aggregate demand was so elastic.
PSunday is the lowest price listed on Pricewatch on the most recent Sunday. One would
expect higher values of this variable to be associated with higher sales through Pricewatch
for two reasons: it should be associated with a higher oﬄine price; and the pool of consumers
interested in buying memory at the current price may be larger when past prices were higher.
Our estimates on the 128MB modules provide little evidence of either eﬀect. PSunday is
signiﬁcant in two of the four estimations, but one of the signiﬁcant estimates is negative.
Among the potential explanations for our inability to ﬁnd the predicted eﬀects are that our
data are limited, that consumers may not be reacting strongly to transient diﬀerences in
online-oﬄine prices because they are unaware of them, and that there may not be much
of a customer-pool eﬀect because few consumers consider purchasing at multiple points in
time.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we have examined Internet retail demand using two diﬀerent approaches:
a cross-sectional analysis of demand in diﬀerent states and a discrete-choice analysis of
demand at an hourly frequency. The two analyses exploit separate sources of variation in
the data: the state-level analysis ignores all of the variation in competitive conditions; and
the discrete-choice analysis uses state ﬁxed eﬀects to absorb any persistent factors like tax
rates.
Our most basic conclusion on sales taxes is that they are an important driver of e-retail
activity. Our state-level regressions show clearly that sales are higher in states that levy
higher sales taxes on traditional retail purchases. The fact that the websites we study sell
so little in California is strong evidence that what we are picking up is a tax eﬀect and not
some artifact of unobserved heterogeneity. The environment we study is somewhat unusual
in that consumers are highly savvy and price-sensitive, but in this environment at least,
29The largest manufacturers reached agreements with the DOJ in 2004 to 2006. These included $700
million in ﬁnes and jail time for senior executives at Inﬁneon, Hynix, and Samsung.
25we would agree with Goolsbee’s (2001) conclusion that applying sales taxes to e-retail sales
could reduce e-retail demand by one-quarter or more. Our discrete-choice analysis is not
inconsistent with this conclusion, but is a little surprising in light of our earlier results.
We ﬁnd that consumers do not pay as much attention to diﬀerences in taxes as they do
to diﬀerences in pre-tax prices when choosing between e-retailers. Taxes do matter to
consumers, though, and given how tightly distributed prices in this market are, they can
have large eﬀects on consumer behavior.
The state-level analysis indicates that geography still matters in e-retail. The websites
we study make more sales to states that are closer to California in a shipping-time metric.
We do not ﬁnd an analogous eﬀect, however, in our discrete-choice analysis. One thing we
do ﬁnd consistently in the discrete-choice analysis is that consumers have a preference for
buying from in-state e-retailers. We think this is an interesting result on the sources of
geographic diﬀerentiation. It has implications for market structure that would diﬀer from
what one would obtain from thinking about shipping times. A world where consumers care
about purchasing from their home state could lead to a less concentrated e-retail sector with
many small ﬁrms, whereas a world where consumers do not have a home-state preference
but do care about shipping times could lead to a sector dominated by a few large ﬁrms
that eﬀectively use distributed warehouses to minimize both shipping times and sales tax
liabilitites.
A couple of our results suggest that there is substantial substitution between online and
oﬄine retail. Most states have few e-retailers listed on Pricewatch. Accordingly, most of
the tax-demand relationship we identify in the state-level analysis must be coming from
substitution away from traditional retail. Similarly, we think of our estimate of the eﬀect
of prices on the total Pricewatch demand as being too large to be due to market expansion
eﬀects and hence must be coming at least in part from online-oﬄine substitution. We do
not, however, ﬁnd convincing evidence of short-term online-oﬄine substitution from our
analysis of recent past prices.
Taken together we see our results as suggesting that there are limitations to consumer
rationality. In each of the dimensions we analyze, there are some considerations that are
quite easy for consumers to recognize and some that are more subtle or would entail more
26costly information aquisition. A general theme that appears to emerge from our analysis is
that consumers are closer to the traditional rational ideal on the easier tasks.
In terms of sales taxes, for example, it is quite easy for consumers, in high tax states,
especially, to learn the general principle that buying things online saves on taxes, and we ﬁnd
clear evidence sales being higher in high tax states. That the tax beneﬁt will be larger on
more expensive items is a little more subtle, and the evidence on whether tax rate-sensitivity
is larger for more expensive items in our data is less clear. Our discrete-choice analysis also
indicates that consumers do not make a one-for-one tradeoﬀ between diﬀerences in item
prices and sales taxes. It is intuitive that the way that data is presented on Pricewatch
might lead to such a result if consumers are boundedly rational. Pricewatch’s lists includes
the state in which each ﬁrm is located so that a consumer who understood that taxes would
only be assessed on in-state purchases (and knew his local sales tax rate) could compute the
sales taxes, but taxes are not presented to the consumer and the lists are always sorted on
the basis of the pre-tax price. In this vein it is noteworthy that Brynjolfsson and Smith’s
(2001) contrasing estimates—they ﬁnd that react twice as strongly to tax diﬀerences as they
do to item price diﬀerences—were obtained in an environment in which taxes are explicity
presented to consumers in a list that is sorted on the basis of tax-inclusive prices.30
Similar patterns exist in the other dimensions of behavior we consider. The tax diﬀer-
ences we study are stable over time. This should make it very easy for consumers in high
tax states to learn that purchasing online is a good idea. The high-frequency volatility of
memory module prices on Pricewatch is highly unusual. We ﬁnd it plausible that we may
have a harder time ﬁnding consumer reactions to these short run price movements because
(a) “rational” consumers with information acquisition costs may not have invested in up-
to-date infomation on the evolution of the online-oﬄine price gap over the last few days, or
(b) “boundedly rational” consumers may not have ﬁgured out that they can exploit retail
stores’ “stale” prices when there has been a very recent run up in online prices.
The environment we study is somewhat special. The consumers shopping through
30Hossain and Morgan (2006) ﬁnd that consumers do not fully take shipping costs into account in a
neatly-designed ﬁeld experiment involving selling items on eBay. A commonality between shipping costs in
their experiment and tax diﬀerences on Pricewatch is that the shipping cost diﬀerences were easily available
in the item descriptions, but some eﬀort would have been required to learn the diﬀerences.
27Pricewatch are more technically savvy than most and we presume much more price sensitive.
They are presented with more complete data on competing price oﬀers than are usually
available. In other dimensions, however, the environment might not be so unrepresentative.
The fact that Pricewatch does not compute or highlight diﬀerences in sales taxes and the
fact that it lacks information on oﬄine prices may lead to tax- and online-oﬄine substitution
eﬀects that are not so diﬀerent from those we would see in other environments. Limitations
on consumer rationality may also make it easier to generalize from our results: it is much
easier to generalize in a model where a fraction of consumers always buy online to save on
taxes than in a model where behavior depends in a complex way on the number of dollars
in taxes that can be avoided, for instance.
Technically, our analysis is standard. What could perhaps be more broadly useful is
our suggestion that discrete-choice models may be usefully applied to datasets containing
quantity data for one ﬁrm. Price data for all of the ﬁrms in a market are fairly easy to
come buy. Quantity data are much harder to obtain. There may, however, be many other
situations like ours where quantity data could be obtained from one ﬁrm. (This could even
be done in a ﬁeld experiment.) Our example suggests that this may be a fruitful way to
explore interﬁrm competition.
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30Variable Mean St.Dev Min Max
Quantity128 203.5 176.0 19.0 762.0
Quantity256 85.6 84.3 5.0 391.0
OﬄineSalesTaxRate 0.057 0.021 0.000 0.084
InternetAccess 0.57 0.07 0.41 0.70
ShippingTime 3.89 0.92 1.50 5.00
ComputerStores
GasStations 0.092 0.034 0.041 0.184
log(Population) 15.02 1.04 13.11 17.33
Table 1: Summary statistics for state-level regressions
31Product/Estimation Method
128MB 256MB 128MB 256MB
OﬄineSalesTaxRate 5.96 6.33 6.08 7.47
(2.16) (2.59) (2.39) (2.71)
California -1.03 -0.84 -1.01 -0.85
(4.01) (3.21) (3.18) (2.46)
ShippingTime -0.10 -0.07 -0.09 -0.05
(2.04) (1.32) (1.64) (0.82)
Internet Access 1.89 1.04 1.86 0.91
(2.62) (1.25) (2.32) (1.06)
ComputerStores
GasStations 1.90 4.39 1.94 5.05
(1.11) (2.29) (0.98) (2.36)
log(Population) 0.85 0.89 0.87 0.91
(20.54) (18.98) (18.51) (17.88)
Estimation Neg. Binomial OLS OLS
Observations 51 51 51 51
R2 0.93 0.93
Note: The ﬁrst two columns report estimates from negative binomial regressions with
Quantity128 and Quantity256 as dependent variables. The third and fourth columns present
estimates from related OLS regressions with the log(Quantity) as the dependent variable.
t-statistics in parentheses.
Table 2: State-level regressions
Product/Sample Period
Product: 128MB 256MB
Price-based sample $20-$50 $100+ $20-$50 $100+
SalesTaxRate 4.22 7.32 7.43 8.89
(1.74) (2.95) (2.26) (2.62)
California -0.92 -1.39 -0.62 -0.74
(3.26) (6.29) (2.24) (2.37)
ShipTime -0.10 -0.15 -0.00 0.01
(1.88) (2.79) (0.01) (0.13)
InternetAccess 1.13 3.67 -0.69 1.97
(1.38) (4.32) (0.62) (1.63)
ComputerStores
GasStations 1.05 1.61 5.59 6.25
(0.55) (0.88) (2.24) (2.38)
Log(Population) 0.85 0.94 0.80 0.85
(18.05) (19.26) (13.20) (12.91)
Note: The table reports estimates from negative binomial regressions. The dependent
variable is the number of orders received from each state during the time period when the
lowest price listed on Pricewatch was in the speciﬁed range. t-statistics in parentheses.
Table 3: State-level regressions examining sales in diﬀerent time periods
32Variable Mean St.Dev Min Max Mean St.Dev Min Max
128MB PC100 128MB PC133
Quantity 0.013 0.118 0 4 0.010 0.105 0 2
Price 65.52 34.56 21 123 74.11 36.70 21 131
MinPrice 61.71 33.46 20 122 71.72 37.27 20 131
Rank 6.5 4.1 1 21 6.0 4.5 1 21
MinPrice − PSunday -0.24 3.30 -13 13 -0.33 3.54 -16 16
Number of Obs.: 154070 Num. Obs.: 133310
256MB PC100 256MB PC133
Quantity 0.004 0.068 0 3 0.007 0.091 0 4
Price 129.98 65.10 43 258 146.17 79.27 39 291
MinPrice 120.19 58.29 43 215 135.24 75.54 39 269
Rank 5.9 3.1 1 12 6.3 3.05 1 12
MinPrice − PSunday -1.39 5.12 -18.75 35 -2.07 8.21 -51 36
Number of Obs.: 120420 Num. Obs.: 124520
Table 4: Summary statistics for individual-level regressions
33Product
128MB 128MB 256MB 256MB
PC100 PC133 PC100 PC133
Variables aﬀecting choices between sites
Price -0.53 -0.82 -0.49 -0.47
(33.16) (28.64) (20.39) (28.37)
SalesTax 0.05 0.38 0.10 1.27
(0.37) (2.52) (1.07) (1.98)
HomeState 1.24 1.31 1.13 1.23
(3.69) (2.92) (2.31) (1.19)
ShippingTime 0.14 -0.02 -0.06 -0.11
(2.34) (0.30) (0.74) (2.01)
SecondScreen -1.58 0.61
(1.05) (0.18)
Variables aﬀecting total Pricewatch demand
Weekend -0.43 -0.34 -0.31 -0.80
(10.88) (7.36) (4.11) (11.41)
MinPrice -0.03 -0.03 0.00 -0.03
(5.51) (4.47) (0.19) (9.27)
PSunday 0.001 0.003 -0.033 0.015
(0.17) (0.49) (4.67) (3.29)
TimeTrend1 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
(5.29) (6.93) (4.71) (3.37)
TimeTrend2 -0.03 -0.02 -0.03 -0.04
(4.89) (3.98) (4.25) (3.68)
TimeTrend3 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.01
(4.78) (0.17) (0.53) (1.50)
TimeTrend4 -0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.01
(5.84) (2.85) (6.36) (8.23)
Observations 154070 133310 120420 124520
R2 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.04
Note: Dependent variables are number of distinct customers in each of ten states ordering
from each of websites A and B in each of approximately 7900 hours. Regressions also
contain state and website dummies. t-statistics are in parentheses.
Table 5: Discrete-choice model of hourly sales of memory modules in ten states
34